Abstract. Constraint specific wireless sensor networks need energy efficient and secure communication mechanisms. In this paper we propose Lightweight Security protocol (LSec) that fulfils both requirements. LSec provides authentication and authorization of sensor nodes with simple secure key exchange scheme. It also provides confidentiality of data and protection mechanism against intrusions and anomalies. LSec is memory efficient that requires 72 bytes of memory storage for keys. It only introduces 74.125 bytes of transmission and reception cost per connection. 
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Introduction
Wireless sensor networks consist of a large number of small size sensor nodes deployed in the observed environment. Sensor nodes have smaller memory (8K of total memory and disk space) and limited computation power (8-bit, 4 MHz CPU) [1] . They usually communicate with a powerful base station which connects sensor nodes with external networks. The limited energy at senor nodes creates hindrances in implementing complex security schemes. There are two major factors for energy consumption: 1. Transmission and reception of data. 2. Processing of query request.
Wireless networks are relatively more vulnerable to security attacks than wired networks due to the broadcast nature of communication [1] . In order to implement security mechanism in sensor networks, we need to ensure that communication overhead is less and consumes less computation power. With these constraints it is impractical to use traditional security algorithms and mechanism meant for powerful workstations.
Sensor networks are vulnerable to a variety of security threats such as DoS, eavesdropping, message replay, message modification, malicious code, etc. In order to secure sensor networks against these attacks, we need to implement message confidentiality, authentication, message integrity, intrusion detection and some other security mechanism. Encrypting communication between sensor nodes can partially solve the problems but it requires a robust key exchange and distribution scheme.
In general, there are three types of key management schemes [2, 3] : Trusted Server scheme, self enforcing scheme and key-predistribution scheme. Trusted server schemes relies on a trusted base station, that is responsible for establishing the key agreement between two communicating nodes as described in [4] . It uses symmetric key cryptography for data encryption. The main advantages of this scheme are, it is memory efficient, nodes only need to store single secret key and it is resilient to node capture. But the drawback of this scheme is that it is energy expensive, it requires extra routing overhead in the sense that each node need to communicate with base station several times [3] . Self enforcing schemes use public key cryptography for communication between sensor nodes. This scheme is perfectly resilient against node capture and it is fully scalable and memory efficient. But the problem with the traditional public keys cryptography schemes such as DSA [5] or RSA [6] is the fact that they require complex and intensive computations which is not possible to perform by sensor node having limited computation power. Some researchers [7, 8] uses Elliptic curve cryptography as an alternative to traditional public key systems but still not perfect for sensor networks. Third scheme is key pre-distribution scheme based on symmetric key cryptography, in which limited numbers of keys are stored on each sensor node prior to their deployment. This scheme is easy to implement and does not introduce any additional routing overhead for key exchange. The degree of resiliency of node capture is dependent on the pre-distribution scheme [3] .
Quite recently some security solutions have been proposed in [9, 10, 11, 12, 13 ] especially for wireless sensor networks but each suffers from various limitations such as higher memory and power consumptions that are discussed in section 4.
Keeping all these factors in mind we propose a lightweight security protocol (LSec) for wireless sensor networks. LSec combines the features of trusted server scheme and Self Enforcing security schemes. Our main contribution is the designing and implementation of LSec that provides
• Authentication and Authorization of sensor node.
• Simple Secure key exchange scheme.
• Secure defense mechanism against anomalies and intrusions.
• Confidentiality of data.
• Usage of both symmetric and asymmetric schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the details of LSec. Section 3 presents the simulation results and evaluation of LSec. Section 4 presents the comparison of LSec with other security solutions and Section 5 consists of conclusion and future direction.
Light weight Security Protocol (LSec)
The basic objective of LSec is to provide lightweight security solution for wireless sensor networks where all nodes can communicate with each other. LSec can support both static and mobile environment, which may contain single and multiple Base Stations (BS). Basic system architecture is shown in figure 1 . LSec uses both symmetric and asymmetric schemes for providing secure communication in wireless sensor networks. Key Management Module (KMM) is used to store public and shared secret key of each node with BS to the database. Token Generator Module (TGM) is used to generate the tokens for the requesters, which will be further used by the other communicating party for the authentication of requester node. Authorization Module (AzM) is used to check whether a particular node is allowed to communicate with other node or group. Lightweight mobile agents will only be installed on Cluster heads which sends alerts messages to intrusion detection system (IDS), which is responsible for detecting any anomaly or intrusion in the network. Basic assumptions and rules of LSec are given below.
Assumptions
1. Base Station (BS) is the trusted party and it will never be compromised.
Compromising the Base station can render the entire sensor network useless, and it is the only point from where sensor node can communicate with external networks. 2. Only Base Station (BS) knows the Public keys (Pk) of all the sensor nodes in the network. Communicating nodes will know each other's public key during the time of connection establishment.
Rules
• Asymmetric scheme will only be used for sharing ephemeral secret key between communicating nodes.
• For every session new random secret key will be used.
• Data will be encrypted by using symmetric schemes because these schemes
Sensor Nodes are considered to be executed three to four times faster than asymmetric schemes [14] .
LSec Packet Format
LSec packet format is shown in 
Procedure
LSec works in three phases, authentication and authorization phase, key distribution phase, and data transmission phase. Authentication and authorization is performed during the exchange of "Request" and "Response" packet by using symmetric scheme. Key distribution phase involves sharing of random secret key in a secure manner by using asymmetric scheme. In this phase "INIT" and "ACK" packets will be exchanged. Data transmission phase involves transmission of data packet in an encrypted manner. Let's suppose node A wants to communicate with the node B. It will first send request packet to Base station, for receiving token and public key of node B. The request packet is encrypted with the secret key shared between node A and BS. BS first checks in the database via AzM that weather node A has rights to establish connection with node B. If yes, it generates the token which will be further used by the node B for the authentication of node A. That token is encrypted with secret key shared between node B and BS, so that node A will not able to decrypt token. BS will sent back a response packet that contains token, public key of node B and Nonce (Unique Random Number) that was there in request packet. Nonce will ensure node A that packet came from genuine BS. When node A gets the positive response from BS it sent the INIT packet to node B that contains Nonce, its own public key and token generated by BS. The whole INIT packet is encrypted with the public key of node B. When node B gets INIT packet it first check token, if it is correct, it will generate the secret key and sent it back to node A in an encrypted manner. When node A gets ACK packet, it deletes the public key of node B from its memory, and sent data to node B by using new session secret key. When data transmission complete, both nodes delete that session key. For group communication, each node uses the group secret key for data transmission in a secure manner. Cluster head will update this key after periodic interval.
Simulation and Performance Analysis
We have tested our LSec protocol on Sensor Network Simulator and Emulator (SENSE) [15] . In sensor node we introduce the middleware between application layer and network layer as shown in figure 2.
Fig 2. Sensor Node Architecture
That middleware uses LSec for the enforcement of security in the sensor network. At application layer we use constant bit rate component (CBR) that generate constant traffic during simulation between two communicating sensor nodes. For the demonstration and performance evaluation of LSec, CBR is run with and without LSec. We randomly deploy 100 sensor nodes plus one Base station (BS) in 1000 by 1000 terrain. Basic simulation parameters employed are described in table 3. 
Performance Analysis of Communication Overhead
In our simulation scenario, application sent data packets of size 30 bytes in a periodic interval Where as 'Nc' is the total number of connections. 
Performance Analysis of Power Computation
Power Computation primarily depends upon the kind of symmetric and asymmetric scheme. If we assume that computation power required for symmetric encryption and decryption scheme is CSE and CSD respectively and computation power of asymmetric encryption and decryption scheme as CAE and CAD respectively. Then the total power consumption required by single node during first two phases is
Power Computation = (CSE + CSD) + (CAE + CAD)
Computation power required by a single node during data transmission phase is calculate as,
Power Computation= (TNSP*CSE) + (TNRP*CSD)
Where TNSP is the Total Number of Sent data packets and TNRP is the Total Number of received data packets.
Performance Analysis of Memory Consumption
Every sensor node needs to store only six keys, three of them are permanent and three are ephemerals. Permanent keys consist of one public key (self), one private keys and one public key of BS. Ephemerals keys consist of group key, public key of other node and session secret key. In order to save these keys only 72 bytes are needed. Details are given in table 4 . This approach will make sensor network memory efficient. 
Performance Analysis of Energy Consumption
The main source of energy consumption at sensor node is its transmission and reception cost. We used SENSE that consumes energy in four different modes: TRANSMIT, RECIEVE, IDLE, and SLEEP. Energy consumption rate of each mode is given in 
Resilience against Node Compromise
Single node compromised will not expose the whole communication in network. Only the communication links that are established with compromised node will expose the network. Let's suppose 'Ncn' is the set of nodes that establish connections and 'Ncp' is the set of compromised nodes. Then Ncn ∩ Ncp will give us the set of nodes that are compromised as well as connected. Then the maximum number of connections that can be exposed only if all compromised nodes connected to uncompromised nodes. On the other hand minimum numbers of links that can be exposed only if all compromised nodes are connected with each other.
If we assume that sensor networks consists of 1000 nodes and total 500 connections established between pair of nodes then the total links that can be minimum and maximum compromised is shown in figure 5 . 
Comparison of LSec with Other Security Solutions
Comparison of all above discussed schemes with LSec is given in table 5. We provided comparison from the perspective of memory requirement, transmission cost, and some other basic security parameters such as authentication, authorization, confidentiality, etc. Data integrity is generally handled at link layer with the help of some hashing schemes such as MD5, SHA1 etc or by CRC schemes and availability is normally handled at physical layer. LSec lies between network and application layer that's why it doesn't provide explicit data integrity and availability support. 
Conclusion and Future Directions
We proposed Lightweight security protocol (LSec) for wireless sensor networks, which provides authentication and authorization of sensor node. It also provides simple secure key exchange scheme and confidentiality of data. LSec is highly scalable and memory efficient. It uses 6 keys, which takes only 72 bytes of memory storage. It introduces 74.125 bytes of transmission and reception cost per connection. It has the advantage of simple secure defense mechanism against compromised nodes. In future, we will try to solve the issue related to the neighboring nodes of the base station that suffered from higher communication overhead by forwarding request and response packets during authentication and authorization phase.
